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A b s tra c t: M ulticast Open Shortest Path First (M O SPF) is an enhancem ent to unicast routing protocol OSPF. It has been widely used in
m any m ulticast applications for years. How ever, its security is still a m ajor concern in som e applications. M uch w ork has been done on data
protection, but only a few w orks have been done on m em ber access control mechanisms. In this paper, w e present a new secure m ulticast
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1

IN TR O D U CTIO N

M ulticasting
provides
an
efficient
communication
mechanism in both private networks and Internet for largescale
content
distribution,
such
as
audio
and
videoconference, web casting, interactive game and video
on demand. There are three basic types o f multicast routing
protocols: distance vector, link state and shared trees (M iller
1998). M O SPF belongs to the category o f link state (Moy,
1994, 1998). M OSPF is also called dense-mode multicast
routing protocol, because it requires som e form o f flooding
o f datagram s to the network to find m ulticast routes. This
protocol is suitable for areas with dense concentrations o f
group members.
M OSPF is w idely used in multicast but the security issues
are still a concern where confidential and high value content
are being transferred. Based on the properties o f the
multicast, the com ponents that should be secured include
(Judge et al., 2003, Hardjono et al., 2000): multicast
distribution tree protection, end-to-end data protection
through cryptographic operations and member access
control. The end-to-end data protection includes data
integrity, source authentication and data confidentiality. The
main method used to protect the data is group key
encryption, in which the m ulticast traffic is encrypted with a
symm etric key and all authorized group members are given
the decryption key. M any schem es w ere proposed to
provide the efficient re-keying for the group key
management protocol (Hardjono et ah, 2000, Kruus et ah,
1998). These methods can become very complicated
because the membership is dynamic. In addition, as

mentioned in (Judge et ah, 2003), there are some other
related issues w here encryption o f com munications may not
be possible for legal reasons; furthermore, even where data
confidentiality is provided, it may be possible to do traffic
analysis depending on the layer where encryption is done.
Because o f the above reasons, research was done to develop
group access control schemes as an additional security
mechanism (H ardjono et ah, 2000, Shields et ah, 1999,
Judge et ah, 2002). In this paper, we propose a new secure
multicast scheme and protocol for M OSPF based on an IDbased distributed encryption scheme.
The rest o f this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the security architecture for multicast and the
Internet Group M anagem ent Protocol (IGMP) and reviews
the proposed m em ber access control schemes. Section 3
describes the M O SPF protocol architecture. Section 4 gives
the novel distributed encryption scheme that is used in the
scheme. Section 5 presents our new secure multicast
architecture and protocol for M OSPF. Finally, in section 6,
we give some concluding remarks.

2

S E C U R IT Y A R C H IT E C T U R E FO R M U LT ICA STIN G

This section briefly reviews security architecture, Internet
Group M anagement protocol and related proposed work
(Hardjono, et ah, 2000, 2002, Cain et ah, 2002, Judge et ah,
2002 ).

The multicast security (M SEC) working group o f the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) presents a multicast

security architecture reference fram ew ork. This Reference
Fram ework is used to classify functional areas, functional
elements, and interfaces.
There are three sets o f functional entities and three
functional areas. The three sets o f functional entities are the
Policy Server, Group Controller and K ey Server (GCKS),
Sender and Receiver. The policy server represents both the
entity and functions that is used to create and manage
security policies specific to a m ulticast group. The Group
Controller and Key Server (GCKS) represent both the entity
and functions relating to the m anagem ent o f cryptographic
keys used by a multicast group. The Sender is an entity that
sends data to the multicast group. B ased on the num ber o f
the senders, m ulticast is divided into tw o types, i.e. 1-to -N
and M-to-N, For the 1-to-N m ulticast type, only one sender
can transm it data to the group. For the M -to-N multicast
type, m any or all group m em bers can transm it data to the
group. The three functional areas are M ulticast data
handling, Group key M anagem ent, and the M ulticast
security policies.
Our new secure multicast architecture and protocol for
M OSPF will follow this reference framework.
2.1

IG M P Protocol

The Internet Group M anagem ent Protocol (IGM P) is the
protocol through which hosts exchange inform ation with
their local routers. This protocol is specified in (Cain et al.,
2002). It is used by IPv4 systems (hosts and routers) to
report their IP multicast group m em berships to any
neighboring multicast routers. IGM P lets a router keep track
o f IP membership on its local LA N S by 2 types IGMP
messages: sending IGMP host m em bership queries and
receiving IGM P host membership reports. The IGMP has
the following rules: firstly, host sends an IG M P "report" to
jo in a group; secondly, host does not send a report when it
wants to leave a group; finally, m ulticast routers send IGM P
queries to the all hosts group periodically to see w hether any
group members exist on their subnet works. I f no response
is received after a number o f queries, the router assumes
that there is no group member on the network.
We note that the multicast provides an open group model.
This open model has many beneficial aspects, but it also
causes security issues, as it cannot control m em bership to a
set o f authorized hosts. Security problem s include
eavesdropping, theft o f service, denial o f service and
possibly cryptanalysis. The next section will discuss
possible solutions to addressing these issues.
2.2

Member A c c e s s Control Schem es

As mentioned before, the open group model properties o f
the multicast may cause serious security problem s. On the
other
hand,
the
traditional
m ethods
used
to
cryptographically encrypt inform ation cannot solve these
problems. To solve these security problem s, we need to

control the ability o f hosts to jo in the multicast group. There
are three functions required for multicast receiver access
control. It includes group policy specification functions,
access request functions and access control functions (Judge
et al., 2002, 2003). The proposed solutions can be found in
(Hardjono et al., 2000, Judge et al., 2002, Ballardie et al.,
1995). D epending upon the type o f revocation provided,
these multicast receiver authorization solutions are
classified into three types: centralized, ACL supported and
tim e-limited processor. However, at each step o f the way, it
m ust decide w hich one is the next task to map: it maps
‘more im portant’ tasks first when possible, where this is
determined by the weight o f a node.
In (Hardjono et al., 2000), Hardjono and Cain present an
approach that makes use o f the existing Group Key
m anagem ent protocol for host members o f a group to
deliver the IGM P keying material to the host and the
m ulticast distribution tree to deliver the necessary keying
material to the m ulticast routers. The receiver host sends a
jo in request including the access token to the router, and the
router verifies the access token is in the token list. In
(Ballardie et al., 1995), Ballardie and Crowcroft present a
version o f IGMP that allows receivers to be authorized
before joining the group. The architecture includes the
group owner (the initiator), the authorization server, the
routers and the receiver hosts. The group owner (the
initiator) distributes the ACLs to the authorization servers.
The receiver host sends a request to an authorization server
to obtain an authorization stamp. When the receive host
joins this group, it sends a join request to the router with this
authorization stamp. Then the router forwards the receiver
host’s request to the authorization server for approval. In
(Judge et al., 2002), Judge and Ammar proposed a
com prehensive architecture GOTHIC for providing group
access control.
2.3

Gothic Architecture

In this section, we briefly describe the Gothic architecture
proposed in (Judge et al., 2002). Our new scheme extends
the Gothic architecture and provides a novel group key
management scheme that enables the management o f
m ulticast groups to be efficient. The Gothic includes two
systems: the group policy management system and the
group m em ber authorization system (Figure 1). The group
policy m anagem ent system performs group policy
specification functions. It includes three components: the
group owner, the group owner determination and
authentication system (GODAS), and the access control
server (ACS). The group owner provides the security policy
for the group and the list o f the authorized members to the
ACS. The group ow ner determination and authentication
system (GODAS) provide the system to verify that the host
is the group owner. The group member authorization system
carries out access request functions and access control
functions. This system involves the interaction among the
host, the router and the ACS.

G r o u p P olicy
M anagem eni

throughout the O SPF routing domain so M OSPF routers can
compute outgoing interface lists. The M OSPF routers use
the Dijkstra algorithm to compute shortest path tree for each
group.

„

System

G ro u p y
O w ner

G ro u p M ember
A uthorisation
System

Figure 1 Gothic Architecture

This system works as follows. First, the group owner
contacts the ACS, and the ACS perform s the authentication
and authorization. Then the group ow ner provides the group
policy to the ACS. Next, the receiver hosts request a
capability from the ACS. These capabilities are identity
based and time limited. After this, the receiver host can send
a jo in request along with the capabilities that it received
from its ACS to the router. The router host authenticates the
receiver host and verifies the capabilities. Finally, the
receiver host is allowed to join the group.

3
M O S P F (M ULTICAST O PE N S H O R T PATH FIRST)
A R C H IT E C T U R E

In this section, we will briefly introduce the M OSPF
architecture (Moy 1994) Figure 2 shows a sample a MOSPF
configuration (Nx-the network, RTx-the router, M -the
member, H-the host, number is the cost from the routers to
network).

Each M O SPF router in the distribution tree for each
source/destination com bination bases its forwarding
decision on forw arding cache. A forwarding cache entry is
built from local group database and datagram's shortest path
tree. The local group database records the group
m embership o f the router's directly attached networks. This
local group database is built from the Internet Group
M anagem ent Protocol (IGM P). In multi-access network,
one router is selected as Designated Router (DR); this
Designated R outer originates a network links advertisement
on behalf o f th e netw ork and becomes adjacent to all other
routers on the network. The router updates the local group
database w hen the m em bership state is changed. The
datagram's shortest path tree depicts the intermediate hops
taken by a m ulticast datagram when it is sent from the
source to the individual group members. This shortest path
tree is built on demand. It is built by using the router-LSAs
and netw ork-LSA s in the link states database and having the
source netw ork as root. The branches that do not include the
router and transit networks are pruned from the tree.
For our new secure m ulticasting protocol, we need to add
the encryption key into the LSA control messages, so that
all the routers can store the encryption key to verify the
prospective members.

4

K E Y G E N E R A T IO N A L G O R IT H M

Our approach involves the proposal o f a dynamic group key
management schem e that enables secure and efficient
updating o f group members. We achieve this by
constructing a public key that is associated with several
associated private keys. Our proposal for secure
m ulticasting is based on our earlier work on key distribution
described in (M u, et al., 2004)
4.1

Figure 2 MOSPF Architecture

M O SPF is an extension to O SPF unicast routing protocol.
OSPF routers use link state advertisements (LSAs) to
understand all available links in the network and route
datagram along least cost paths. M O SPF includes multicast
information in OSPF link state advertisements (LSAs) to
construct m ulticast distribution trees. All M OSPF routers
maintain an up-to-date image o f the topology o f the entire
network. The path o f the multicast datagram depends on
both the datagram's source network and destination
m ulticast group. Group m em bership LSAs are flooded

System Se t up

The Group controller and key Server (GCKS) need to set up
the system such that all necessary parameters can be used
during the m ulti-group services oriented application lifetime.
GCKS selects the follow ing parameters:
•

a large prim e p = 2q + 1 where q is also prime,

•

an additive group G] and a multiplicative group G2
(both have order p),

•

a m aster secret key s e Z, and

•

a num ber P

g

G ,.

Based on the ID -based encryption algorithm (Boneh, et al.,
2001), the KDC com putes the system public key Ppuh = sP
w hich is then sent to all membership who have registered

•

Broadcast T to M ulticast group

w ith KDC. KDC also selects two strong public one-way
functions H r. {0,1}* - > G | a n d //? : G! -» { 0 , 1}*

Decryption

4.2

When the members received the T, they can decrypt the
correspondent session key (TEK ) as follows.

Mem bership Registration

A ny users who w ant to join the m ulticsat group have to
register to the GCKS and become a m em ber. We suppose
that there is a secure channel betw een each user and the
KDC. The user applies to jo in the group including his/her
ID. The KDC authorizes a privileged user by send him/her
with private key SID -s Q iD (Q1D = H ^ ID )). A fter registration,
user becomes membership.

4.3

K S mi,K) = x,
c o+

E X‘CJ =D + k(ao+«!*/+—+amx? ) P - D
J=1

C ® D =M k

I f a member does not register to the m ulticast group, s/he
will not decrypt the session key. Therefore s/he could not
get the session key. This is because for any Xj not belonging
to multicast group, £ ” =0 aj x j ^0 mod p.

Algorithm Construction

This scheme consists o f the follow ing 3 steps: Encryption
Setup, Encryption and D eception.

5
A N E W S E C U R E M U LT IC A ST A R C H IT E C T U R E FO R
M O SP F

Encryption Setup
In order to deliver multicast services to corresponding
members, the GCKS or sender needs to setup the following
parameters.
Select a random num ber r e Z .
•

Compute R = rP

•

Compute Xj = e (rQIDi, Ppub).

Where 6 is the W eil pairing mapping.
•

Compute the following polynom ial function

In this section, w e will present our new secure m ulticast
architecture and protocol for MOSPF. This scheme is based
on the algorithm described in last section.
As we discussed before, traditional methods are still prone
to threats such as eavesdropping, theft o f service, or denial
o f service. The proposed solutions are inadequate for
dynamic m ulticast group memberships. Our new secure
multicast scheme for M OSPF is partl^ based on the Gothic
architecture mentioned earlier; it includes two systems
namely the group key and policy management system and
the group member authorization systems (Figure 3).

Then we can obtain:

«.-n

ai =£ r.in

G roup
System

a »->

=

I

G roup K ey and P olicy
M anagem ent

System

”1
N ote that {aj} satisfy ^

= 0 mod p , j = 1 , - ,m

Construct
the
corresponding
exponential
fu n ctio n s{a0P , a tP , a 2P ,••• ct„P} = { P 0, Plt P2, - P J
Encryption

5.1

Let M k e {0, 1}* be the multicast session key (TEK), then
we can encrypt it as follows.
•

Select a random num ber R e Z and a random
number D e G | .

•

Compute (m+2) tuple

T <- { R , M © H 2{ D ) , D + k Pt , k P l t = ( R , M 0 H 2 ( Z) ), C 0 , C,
, C m)

Figure 3 Secure Multicast Architecture fo r MOSPF

, k P m)

Group Key and Policy Managem ent System

Except for the group policy specification functions
mentioned before in the G othic system, the group key and
policy m anagem ent system also performs the access control
key generation and group session key generation functions.
The group key and policy m anagem ent system involves
three parts: the group owner (for example, Host3 in Figure 3
the access control server (ACS) and the group owner
determination and authentication systems (GODAS). The

group owner generates group access control keys, group
keys for the group. It also provides the list o f authorized
members and other security policy for the group to ACS.
The multicast security policy can be referred to (McDaniel
et al., 2000}. The access control server (ACS) is used to
verify and authorize the prospective member, and it also
involves in the group m em ber authorization system. The
group owner determination and authentication systems
(GODAS) can be used to verify that the host is the group
owner (Judge, et al., 2002}. There are two different systems
for providing such functionality,

preceding section. W e also assume that there is one access
control server (ACS) for the convenience o f describing this
protocol. The access control authorization protocol is
described as follows.

5.3

Authorization Protocol

The group m em ber authorization system includes the
interaction betw een the host and ACS, and the interaction
between the host and the router. This system also assumes
the presences o f the public key infrastructure (PKI).

The first solution makes use o f group certificates (Figure 4).
This is similar to traditional digital certificates.

•

(K+h, K.h) denotes the prospective member hosts
public key and private key pair

•

(K+acs) K-acs) denotes ACS public key and private
key pair.

•

( K+x, CERT k+x) denotes the trusted authority key
and signed certificate
Authentication
Authorization

1 Authorization
REQ

2 Authorization
ACK

0

4 J o in A C K

Figure 4 Group O wner C ertificates

The second solution is the use o f a group ownership service
(Figure 5). This service is a query/reply protocol based
service. It works in 4 different multicast environments. It
includes the multicast address allocation architecture
(MAAA), the source specific m ulticast (SSM ), GLOP, and
Session Announcement Protocol (SA P) / Session
Description Protocol (SDP).

Authentication

Figure 6 Basic Authorization Protocol
The interaction between the prospective member and the
ACS includes the following (Figure 6):
1 H

-»

ACS

: AR

= [ GI D

, ID , C ERT

K ]k t

2. A C S -> H : AA = CAP = [IPH, D NH,G ID ,SJ,CERTt „ a ]t _aa
Here
A R denotes authorization request
ID denotes the prospective member ID
AA denotes authorization acknowledgement

CAP denotes Capability
Figure 5

5.2

Group O wner Service

D N h denotes the host's distinguished name
GID denotes the group ID

Group Member Authorization System

Group member authorization system is the main part o f
controlling access to the group. This system performs the
access request and access control functions. It allows a
prospective group member authorized to becom e a group
member. This system involves three components: a
prospective member host, a router and the access control
server (ACS). We assume that the presence o f a public key
infrastructure, otherwise we can use the digitally sign
messages method (Judge et al., 2002).
The group owner generates the distributed encryption key
set {aj} and decryption key (siD), as discussed in the

Sj denotes the m em ber decryption key SiD

The interaction between the prospective member and the
Router includes:
3 .H

4 .R

R

-»

H

: JR

: JA

=

=

CAP

S ta tu s

Here
•

JR denotes jo in request

•

JA denotes jo in acknowledgement

First, the prospective m em ber sends an authorization request
to the access control server (ACS). T his authorization
request (AR) includes the group ID that the m em ber want to
jo in and his/her public key certificate, w hich is signed by
his/her private key.
Second, the access control server authenticates the
prospective m em ber and decides if this prospective member
can be authorized by check the group policy from the policy
server. Then the access control server returns an
authorization acknow ledgem ent (AA). I f th e request is
successful, the prospective m em ber w ill receive the
decryption key (s1D), w hich is encrypted with the
prospective m em ber’s public key.
Third, the access control server updates the encryption key
set ({a;}) to ({aj}„ew)' As we discussed before, the system
needs to change the related param eter for encryption. These
can then be transferred to one o f the M O SPF routers as part
o f the link state advertisem ent (LSA) inform ation. Based on
the M OSPF routing protocol, all the routers o f the area will
store this information. We assume that the routing control
m essages are secure, which can use the O SPF digital
signature (Murphy et a l , 1997).
Finally, the prospective m em ber sends the jo in request to
the router that is the designated router if the prospective
m em ber connected network has m ore than one router.
Because the router already has the distributed encryption
key, the router can verify whether the prospective m em ber
is qualified. If successful, the prospective m em ber is
accepted as a formal member.

5.4

Reauthorization and Revocation

The group member needs to refresh their m em bership state
to coincide with the soft state o f the IG M P group
m em bership reports and o f the routing protocol. In this
scheme, the router can encrypt the control m essages and
only the qualified mem bers have the decryption key in the
group. The group ow ner can cancel the m em ber who has
left by changing the encryption key. On the other hand, the
m em ber who has left can also rejoin the group; the group
owner only need to change the encryption key. W e can see
that this new scheme can achieve efficient revocation and
reauthorization.
This new secure m ulticast architecture and protocol for
M O SPF has the follow ing advantages com paring to the
previous proposals (Hardjono et al., 2000, Judge et al., 2002,
Ballardie et al., 1995). First, this scheme sim plifies access
control protocol process by adding a group control
encryption key into the M OSPF LSA control messages.
This is because the access control server does not need to
transfer the prospective member's certificates to related
routers every time. N ext, the scheme is flexible and the
group owner can revoke a m em ber at any tim e; other
proposed schemes can not do this, w hether they use a
capability like token or a time limited token. Furtherm ore,
our scheme is scalable, when the group is dynam ic with

members joining and leaving. This is a major advantage o f
our scheme over the previously proposed ones.
In this scheme, we assum e that the router is trusted and can
receive group messages. One can easily envisage a slight
variation o f the scheme which uses a hybrid method by
employing group session key and the group key
m anagement protocols to enhance the system and to achieve
higher levels o f security.

6

C O N C L U D IN G R E M A R K S

In this paper, we have presented a new secure multicast
architecture and protocol for MOSPF. Our new scheme
involves a novel distributed encryption scheme and
simplifies the access control process. The proposed scheme
has good scalability

REFERENCES
Ballardie, A. and Crow craft, J. (1995) “M ulticast specific security
threats and counterm easures,” in ISO C Sysp. Net. and Distrib.
Sys. Sec, San Diego, CA, Feb. 1995, pp. 2-16.
Boneh, D. and Franklin, M. “ Identity-based encryption from the
weil pairing,” Advances in Cryptology-Crypto 2001, LNCS,
vol. 2139, pp. 2 1 3 - 2 2 9 , 2001. Springer-Verlag.
Cain, B. Dearing, S. K ouvelou, I. and Thyagarajan, A. (2000)
Internet G roup M anagem ent Protocol, Version 3, RFC3376,
IETF, O ctober 2002.
Hardjono, T. and Cain, B. (2000) “K ey establishm ent for igmp
authentication in ip m ulticast,” in IEEE European Conference
on Universal M ultiservice Netw orks (ECUMN), CREF,
Colmar, France, 2000..
Hardjono, T. and Tsudik, G. (2000) “ Ip m ulticast security: Issues
and directions,” A nnales de Telecom , pp. 324-340, JulyA ugust 2000.
Hardjono, T. and Weis, B. (2002) M SEC Architecture, draft-ietfm sec-arch- OO.txt,Oct 2002. W ork in Progress.
Judge, P. and Am m ar, M. (2003) “ Security issues and solutions in
m ulticast content distribution: A survey,” IEEE Network,
Jan./Feb. 2003.
Judge, Q. P. and Am m ar, H. M. (2002) “ Gothic: Group access
control architecture for secure m ulticast and any cast,” in IEEE
INFOCOM , July 2002.
Kruus, S. P.and M acker, P. J. (1998) “Techniques and issues in
m ulticast security,” M ILCO M 98, 1998.
M cDaniel, P. Flarney, H. Dinsm ore, P. and Prakash, (2000) A.
M ulticast
Security
Policy,
IETF,
N ovem ber
2000.
http://www.ietf.org/intemet-drafts/draftirtf-smug-mcast-policy01.txt.
Miller, K. C. (1998) M ulticast netw orking and Applications.
A ddison W esley Longm an, Inc., Septem ber 1998.
Moy, J. (1998) OSPF, version 2, RFC2328, IETF, April 1998.
Moy, J. (1994) M ulticast Extensions to OSPF, RFC1584, IETF,
M arch 1994.
M u, Y. and Susilo, W. (2004) “Identity-based instantaneous
broadcast system in m obile ad-hoc networks,” in the 2004
International W orkshop on M obile Systems, E-commerce and
Agent Technology, (USA), pp. 35-40, 2004.
Murphy, S. Badger, M. and W ellington, B. (1997) OSPF with
digital signatures, RFC 2154, IETF, Jun 1997.
Shields, C. and G arcia-Luna-A ceves, J. J. (1999) “Khip - a
scalable protocol for secure m ulticast routing,” in SIGCOMM ,
pp. 53 -6 4 , 1999.

